Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Defense of Essentialism', 'Intensions Revisited' and 'Individuation'

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19 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
13591 Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8967 Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
8965 Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14193 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
14195 If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
14196 Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
14198 Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14191 Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13590 Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine]
14192 Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA]
14197 An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
8483 Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
13589 Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14189 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
13588 A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
13592 Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
8968 If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
8966 Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]